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Summary
Maritime transport is the backbone of the world trade. One of its segments refers to 
maritime offshore industry. These companies perform specific activities and tasks 
related to the exploitation of natural gas and oil from the sea subsoil, in addition to the 
wind power plants installed in marine environment. This study focuses on oil and gas 
offshore companies. Over the past decades this industry has been faced with responsible 
management requirements, which in practice implies the implementation of measures 
aiming at prevention of ecological damage to the marine and coastal environment and 
subsoil. The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) produces combined 
reports on offshore accidents and sets the excellence criteria based on statistical data. 
The companies comply with the responsible management principles which results 
in positive image within the industry and on the international market. This study has 
been based on accident reports for 264 offshore companies. Comparison of the average 
results in the observed group with the results of one selected offshore company has 
provided insights into deviations from the group average indicators. This has enabled 
an analysis of the causes of deviations at the selected company. In addition, the results 
have been studied from the standpoint of the sustainable growth and development of 
the company. 
Sažetak
Pomorski promet  okosnica je svjetske trgovine. Jedan dio odnosi se na odobalne pomorske 
kompanije. Ove kompanije obavljaju specijalizirane zadaće i aktivnosti povezane s 
eksploatacijom podmorja zemnim plinom i naftom ili vjetroelektrana koje se instaliraju u 
morskom okruženju. U ovom radu ciljana skupina upravo su odobalne pomorske kompanije 
za naftu i zemni plin. Posljednjih desetljeća ova je industrija izložena zahtjevima odgovornog 
poslovanja, što u praksi podrazumijeva implementaciju zaštitnih mjera za sprječavanje 
ekološke štete morskog te priobalnog okoliša i podmorja. Međunarodna pomorska udruga 
poduzetnika (engl. The International Marine Contractors Association – IMCA) izrađuje 
skupna izvješća o nezgodama za odobalne kompanije i na temelju statističkih podataka 
postavlja kriterije izvrsnosti. Kompanije prihvaćaju odgovorno poslovanje, a rezultat je 
pozitivan imidž u branši i na međunarodnom tržištu. U ovom radu istraživanje se temelji na 
podatcima o pomorskim nezgodama za 264 pomorske odobalne kompanije. Usporedbom 
prosječnih rezultata za promatranu skupinu kompanija s rezultatima (jedne) izabrane 
odobalne kompanije, došlo se do uvida o odstupanjima u odnosu na grupne pokazatelje. 
Shodno nalazu, istraženi su uzroci odstupanja kod promatrane odobalne pomorske 









1. INTRODUCTION / Uvod
Much attention has been drawn to the environment issues and 
responsible management over the past several decades. The 
transport of goods and passengers, as an essential aspect of the 
global networking, complies with the standards referring to the 
safety, speed and capacity of ships. However, accidents having 
long-term impacts on marine environment continue to occur, 
despite the development of maritime transport technologies. 
The companies that are liable face huge indemnities, negative 
publicity and potential business failure. Prevention of such 
scenarios lies in the implementation of safety measures 
and transparent reporting on potential hazards and on the 
introduced risk avoiding measures. 
Accident risk is always present in offshore operations. The 
purpose of this study is to explore the accidents occurring at 
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the offshore companies that are members of the International 
Marine Contractors Association (IMCA). This source provides 
a consistent collection of accident data supplied by all 
companies within the system. The safety of business operation 
implies responsible management that is harmonised with the 
environmental standards and responsible attitude towards the 
users of such services. It is assumed that the companies having 
low accident risk occurrence records will attract subcontractors 
and service users and consequently increase their market share 
on the competitive market of maritime offshore operations [1]. 
This paper discusses offshore operation accidents with 
a particular focus on statistics and the deviations of the key 
performance indicators between a selected offshore company 
and the average resulting from the analysis of accidents at 264 
offshore companies within IMCA.
2. ACCIDENT STATISTICS / Statistika nezgoda
One of the essential indicators of an offshore company 
performance is the consistent implementation of preventive 
measures [2] aiming at marine pollution prevention. A systemic 
approach to the prevention of marine pollution from ships enables 
the consideration of the marine transport system as a whole and 
makes the management of this system’s units easier. The harmful 
impact of pollutants on humans is the essential reason for studying 
them, observing their distribution in the biosphere, i.e. migrations 
in natural media and, in particular, controlling their emissions from 
various anthropogenic sources [3].
The statistics of accidents at maritime offshore companies 
indicates the deviations in time intervals and per vessel. It feeds 
on the data supplied by internal audits and follow-up of the 
accidents that took place as well as those that were avoided. 
This enables a thorough insight into the state of organisation 
factors with an emphasis on human and material resources. For 
the purpose of this study, the analysis of accidents at maritime 
offshore companies has been performed on the basis of two 
data sources.
The first source of information refers to the reports on 
offshore accidents supplied by IMCA. These data refer to the 
period 2009-2016 and present an overall situation that includes 
the entire IMCA population of 264 offshore companies.
The second source refers to the data supplied by a selected 
and observed maritime offshore company over the period 
2009-2017.
The techniques used while gathering the information from 
IMCA and the selected offshore company were harmonised, 
as they are based on the same survey form that the selected 
offshore company submitted to IMCA annually. There were 
some constraints regarding the time framework as the IMCA did 
not have available data for the year 2017. 
2.1. Reference data / Podatci o istraživanju
In a wide sense, a maritime accident is any extraordinary 
occurrence with harmful outcomes that directly put human 
life, property or environment at risk [4]. Accident statistics 
and key indicators of the performance of offshore companies 
designate the positioning of companies on the maritime 
market. They also allow detailed insights into the category 
and type of accidents that occurred or may have occurred. 
For the purpose of improving the business performance of 
its members (companies engaged in maritime, offshore and 
subsoil operations), IMCA examines the operation safety rate 
by using the survey questionnaires and, in this way, checks the 
compliance with legislation and safety requirements.
It has been already explained that this study is based on 
the data supplied by N = 264 offshore companies and that the 
overall population includes one company whose name is not 
revealed for the purpose of identity protection [5]. The study 
brings an analysis of correlation between the accidents data at 
this company and the overall data that refer to the entire IMCA 
population [6]. The statistical values that have been observed, 
measured and compared include: 
 - Incident – an uncontrolled or unplanned event, resulting in 
injury or fatality.
 - Work Injury – any sign or symptom of physical damage or 
impairment to any part of the body directly resulting from 
an incident, regardless of the length of time between the 
incident and the appearance of the injury.
 - Fatality – a death directly resulting from a work injury 
regardless of the length of time between the injury and death.
 - Permanent Total Disability (PTD) – any work injury which 
incapacitates an employee permanently (e.g. loss of limbs, 
permanent brain damage, and loss of sight) and precludes 
the individual from working either at sea or ashore.
 - Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) – any work injury which 
incapacitates an employee permanently (e.g. loss of limbs, 
permanent brain damage, and loss of sight) but does not 
preclude the individual from working at another position 
either at sea or ashore.
 - Lost Workday Case (LWC) – an injury which results in an 
individual being unable to carry out any of his/her duties 
or to return to work on a scheduled work shift on the day 
following the injury.
 - Lost Time Injuries (LTI) – are the sum of Fatalities, Permanent 
Total Disabilities (PTD), Permanent Partial Disabilities (PPD) 
and Lost Workday Cases (LWC), i.e. this value is calculated 
according to the formula (1): 
LTI Fatalities PTD PPD LWC= + + +          (1)
 - Lost time incident frequency rate (LTIFR) is the number of LTI 
per unit exposure hours and is calculated by the formula (2):
1.000.000
Exposure hours
LTILTIFR ⋅=          (2)
 - Restricted Work Case (RWC) – an injury which results in an 
individual being unable to perform all normally assigned 
work functions during a scheduled work shift or being 
assigned to another job on a temporary or permanent basis.
 - Medical Treatment Case (MTC) – any work-related injury, 
illness or loss of consciousness (unless due to ill health), 
requiring more than first aid treatment by a physician, 
dentist, surgeon or registered medical personnel.
 - Total Recordable Incidents (TRI) – are the sum of all Fatalities, 
Lost Time Injuries, Restricted Work Cases and Medical 
Treatment Cases. This value is calculated by the formula (3):
TRI LTI RWC MTC= + +          (3)
 - Total recordable incident frequency rate (TRIFR) is calculated 
as the sum of recordable incidents (all Fatalities, Lost Time 
Injuries, Restricted Work Cases and Medical Treatment Cases) 
per unit exposure hours, i.e. according to the formula (4):
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1.000.000
Exposure Hours
TRIF TR RI ⋅=          (4)
 - First Aid Case (FAC) – any one-time treatment or minor 
injuries such as bruises, scratches, cuts, burns, etc. The 
first aid may or may not be administered by a physician or 
registered professional.
 - Near Miss – event or sequence of events which did not result 
in an injury but which, under slightly different conditions, 
could have done so.
 - Exposure Hours – 24 hours per day while serving on board.
2.2. Correlation statistics of the gathered accident 
data / Statistika korelacije prikupljenih podataka o 
nezgodama
Table 1 presents the overall data for 264 companies over the 
period 2009.-2016. for the variables [7]: 
1. FAR (Fatal accident rate), 
2. LTIFR (Lost time incident rate), and 
3. TRIFR (Total recordable incident rate).
Table 1 IMCA: accidents at maritime offshore companies           
(N = 264) from 2009 to 2016
Tablica 1 IMCA: nezgode kod odobalnih pomorskih kompanija 
(N=264) od godine 2009. do 2016.
IMCA FAR IMCA LTIFR IMCA TRIFR IMCA
2009 0 1.34 7.86
2010 0 1.62 6.29
2011 10.35 1.39 4.86
2012 0 1.24 5.13
2013 0 1.55 4.04
2014 22.46 1.71 4.46
2015 11.81 1.56 4.18
2016 2.73 1.24 6.43
2017 / / /
Table 2 Selected offshore company: accidents from 2009 to 2017
Tablica 2. Odabrana odobalna kompanija: nezgode od 2009. do 2017.
Selected offshore 
company FAR LTIFR TRIFR
2009 0 6.91 20.75
2010 0 0 8.04
2011 0 1.87 7.48
2012 0 5.99 7.48
2013 0 5.91 17.74
2014 0.0000001 5.56 7.79
2015 0 4.54 6.81
2016 0 6.58 10.96
2017 0 4.93 6.16
Graph 1. Presents the variables for N = 264 and the variables 
for the selected offshore company: FAR, LTIFR and TRIFR over 
the period 2009-2016, including 2017 for the selected offshore 
company only.
The presented information clearly shows that there were 
no Fatalities (FAR) at the selected offshore company, except 
in 2014 when one person died on board. However, Lost time 
incident rate (LTIFR) was much higher than the IMCA average 
during the observed period, except for the years 2010 and 2011 
when the total accident rate was close to the IMCA average. 
The value referring to total recordable incident rate (TRIFR) 
per unit exposure hours was slightly higher than the IMCA 
average, except in 2009 and 2013 when the deviation was 
more pronounced. It is necessary to point out that offshore 
companies continuously invest in safety of their operations in 
order to protect human resources and strengthen their position 
on the market. Users of maritime offshore industry services 
carefully follow the deviations (whether positive or negative) 
with regard to the average rates recorded in a specific offshore 
sector. These records are based on time intervals.
An example of a time interval report is described in Table 
3. The report consists of twelve time intervals, marked from 
1 to 12 (first column in Table 3). The first interval (1) presents 
Graph 1 IMCA (N = 264) compared to the selected offshore company: accidents from 2009 to 2016, including 2017 for the selected 
offshore company only
Graf 1. IMCA (N=264) uspoređen s odabranom odobalnom kompanijom: nezgode od godine 2009. do 2016. uključujući 2017. samo za 
odabrane odobalne kompanije
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the number of accidents that occurred from 01/02/2016 to 
31/01/2017; the second interval (2) presents the number of 
accidents that occurred from 01/03/2016 to 28/02/2017 and so 
forth, ending with the twelfth interval presenting the number of 
accidents that occurred from 01/01/2017 to 31/12/2017.
Table 3 Report through time intervals
Tablica 3. Izvješće tijekom vremenskih intervala





1 912.324 10 10.96 7 7.67 6.43 1.24
2 912.588 9 9.86 7 7.67 6.43 1.24
3 911.832 8 8.77 6 6.58 6.43 1.24
4 911.496 10 10.97 8 8.78 6.43 1.24
5 910.164 10 10.99 9 9.89 6.43 1.24
6 907.080 9 9.92 8 8.82 6.43 1.24
7 904.572 8 8.84 7 7.74 6.43 1.24
8 902.712 8 8.86 7 7.75 6.43 1.24
9 894.408 8 8.94 7 7.83 6.43 1.24
10 871.992 6 6.88 5 5.73 6.43 1.24
11 842.316 5 5.94 4 4.75 6.43 1.24
12 812.004 5 6.16 4 4.93 6.43 1.24
Graph 2. Shows the correlation of the accident statistics 
TRIFR for the selected company compared to IMCA results, as 
well as the reported LTIFR compared to IMCA results.
At the selected offshore company, the supplied LTIFR results 
closely follow the TRIFR results. However, when compared to 
the IMCA average, the obtained TRIFR results at the observed 
company show a much more pronounced deviation whereas 
the deviation of LTFIR results is less pronounced. The latter 
values are below IMCA average in the 10th, 11th, and 12th intervals.
Table 4 presents detailed accident statistics at the entire IMCA 
offshore population and the selected offshore company.
Graph 3. compares the data presented in Table 4.
This analysis indicates that the lost working time incident 
rate (LTIFR) was close to the IMCA average, while the total 
recordable incident rate including injuries (TRIFR) was much 
higher than the IMCA average. When observing the data 
supplied by the selected offshore company, it is noticed that 
the working time lost due to injuries continuously mirrors the 
overall injury rate (the curves match), except for December, 
when the total injury rate is higher than the rate of injuries that 
cause the loss of working time.
Graph 2 Comparison of accident rates at IMCA and 1 selected offshore company through intervals
Graf 2. Usporedba stopa nezgoda kod IMCA i jedna odabrana odobalna kompanija tijekom razdobljâ
Table 4 Monthly data on the total number of accidents in 2017 per man-hours
Tablica 4. Mjesečni podatci o ukupnom broju nezgoda u 2017. godini po radnima satima
Month Man-hours TRI TRIFR LTI LTIFR IMCATRIFR
IMCA
LTIFR
January 74.868 1 13.36 1 13.36 6.43 1.24
February 68.196 0 6.99 0 6.99 6.43 1.24
March 75.024 0 4.59 0 4.59 6.43 1.24
April 73.032 2 10.31 2 10.31 6.43 1.24
May 75.768 1 10.90 1 10.90 6.43 1.24
June 72.300 0 9.11 0 9.11 6.43 1.24
July 75.684 0 7.77 0 7.77 6.43 1.24
August 76.116 0 6.77 0 6.77 6.43 1.24
September 66.852 0 6.08 0 6.08 6.43 1.24
October 58.008 0 5.59 0 5.59 6.43 1.24
November 48.492 0 5.23 0 5.23 6.43 1.24
December 47.664 1 6.16 0 4.93 6.43 1.24
TOTAL 812.004 5 6.16 4 4.93 6.43 1.24
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3. DISCUSSION / Rasprava
The groundwork of this paper is the analysis of the deviations 
of the statistical data supplied by a selected company with 
reference to the average of the entire population of companies 
engaged in the same trade (N=264), over a defined time 
interval. The identity of the observed company is protected 
and is not revealed in this paper. Still, it can be noted that the 
selected offshore company was established in 2009 and has 
been engaged in oil rig supplying and towing operations. In the 
early days the company had three vessels but the fleet gradually 
increased to reach a sustainable system of 13 vessels from 2012 
onwards. The performance analysis indicates that, over the 
initial period of extensive growth, the company management 
focused more on operation development than on accident 
monitoring. It is true that an incident does not necessarily have 
an impact if it is only recorded and removed. Insights into the 
available data from the previous years indicate a considerable 
discrepancy regarding the recorded cases that could have 
resulted in accidents, i.e. the form of reporting from individual 
vessels was not standardised. Although efforts were made to 
introduce higher quality standards, this did not significantly 
affect the overall business performance assessment with 
reference to the overall IMCA results. It should also be noticed 
that the deviations of performance indicators were sometimes 
very pronounced.
The general quality standard, or the key performance 
indicator (KPI), has been accepted by world’s leading oil 
Graph 3 Comparison of the monthly data on the total accidents in 2017 per man-hours
Graf 3. Usporedba mjesečnih podataka o ukupnim nezgodama u godini 2017. po radnim satima
Table 5. KPI of the observed offshore company
Tablica 5. KPI o promatranoj odobalnoj kompaniji
(KPI=ključni pokazatelj izvedbe)
Oil spilled into the environment









Goal 0 0 <250 <250
Achieved 0 0 0 0
2010
Goal 0 0 <250 <250
Achieved 0 0 0 0
2011
Goal 0 0 <250 <250
Achieved 0 0 8 0
2012
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 0 11 100
2013
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 5 7 0
2014
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 0 100 0
2015
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 50 10 10
2016
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 0 50 400
2017
Goal 0 0 0 0
Achieved 0 0 0
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companies (Exxon, Shell, BP, Total, Chevron, etc.). This standard 
of quality implies that all values referring to emission or waste 
release must be zero. It has been accepted by the maritime 
offshore company that has been selected and observed for 
the purpose of this study. The company has complied with the 
standard since the beginning of the operations and has been 
keeping relevant records on the release of oil and other harmful 
substances from their vessels. Table 5. lists the KPI data. The KPI 
information consists of reports on loss of cargo, oil spilled into the 
sea, oil spills on the deck and in the engine room (in litres).
In some intervals, for instance in the year 2014, there were 
records on the oil spills on the deck and in the engine room. In 
the beginning, when the company operations started, certain 
amount of oil spilled onto the deck or in the engine room was 
tolerable. Just like today, it was essential that nothing was 
spilled overboard as this would cause pollution of the marine 
environment. The following table shows that, at the observed 
company, not much on-board oil spills were recorded over the 
first three years. However, as the operations grew, the fleet grew 
accordingly, and the on-board oil spill incidents increased in 
number, although the amounts were negligible.
Another important indicator of the maritime company 
performance refers to the number of detentions by the Port 
State Control (PSC) and to the deficiencies detected by the PSC 
surveys [8], [9]. Table 6 presents the data on the detected errors/
deficiencies during the PSC inspections. In business documents, 
this parameter is termed PSC (Port State Control).
Table 6 shows that not a single vessel of the observed 
company was detained in port due to a serious deficiency. It is 
obvious that the company has been committed to the quality 
and technical maintenance of the vessels, so that any detected 
deficiency could be eliminated on time. It is worth noting that 
the observed company is also committed to identification and 
prevention of potential undesired and harmful events by raising 
and spreading the awareness of the safety at work culture. Over 
the years, the company adopted the standard implying that the 
number of “near miss” incidents should not ne less than two per 
vessel. The number of deficiencies / observations by the Port State 
Control (PSC) has been determined arbitrarily by a company. It 
is assumed that the number of inspections and detentions by 
PSC due to serious deficiencies must be zero, as the detention of 
a vessel implies a serious loss of time and profit, resulting from 
disruption of operations and charter party agreements.
The Lost time incident rate (LTIFR) and the Total recordable 
incident rate (TRIFR) per unit exposure hours are determined at 
the discretion of a company. Every company has its own criteria 
with regard to the number of people, number of vessels and 
the results from the previous periods. At the observed maritime 
offshore company, the statistical data for the above variables are 
shown in Table 7.
The goal of every company is to achieve minimum incidents at 
work. An incident at work implies a potential loss of working time 
and decrease in workforce productivity. Indeed, the utmost goal 
is to reduce the Lost time incident rate (LTIFR) to zero. Naturally, this 
represents one of the key indicators of a company’s performance. 
However, every maritime company has their own standards with 
reference to the number of employees on board every vessel, the 
size of the fleet and the results from the previous years. Therefore, 
the limits of the Total Recordable Incident Rate Frequency (TRIFR) 
per manhours are set in accordance with individual company 
standards. A detailed analysis like this allows a company to 
define its own business and financial construction and to make 
comparisons with IMCA data.
Since 2012, i.e. the time when the observed company’s fleet 
was completed, the company started to record safety errors that 
could have resulted in an accident. In order to minimise injuries, 
damage and Near Miss events [10], [11] the records have to focus 
on risk assessment, assessment of the situation safety or safety 
conditions. In practice, this procedure is known as the “Safety 
Observation” system or, in other words: systematic observation 
of safety errors that may potentially lead to an accident [12], 
[13]. The purpose of the Safety Observation system is to raise 
Table 6 Number of deficiencies at the vessels of the observed company, detected by PSC from 2009 to 2017
Tablica 6. Broj kvarova na brodovima promatrane kompanije, koje je uočila Lučka državna kontrola od godine 2009. do 2017.
Port supervision
Detained in port Detected deficiencies NEAR MISS total
2009
Goal 0 0 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 0 2,1
2010
Goal 0 <0,5 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 0,82 1,7
2011
Goal 0 <0,5 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 0,82 1,6
2012
Goal 0 <0,5 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 2,56 0,9
2013
Goal 0 <1 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 3,92 0,6
2014
Goal 0 <1 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 3,07 0,5
2015
Goal 0 <1 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 1,15 2,7
2016
Goal 0 <1 >2/vessel
Achieved 0 2,00 0,5
2017
Goal 0 <1 >2/vessel
Achieved 1,33 0,5
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the awareness of onboard safety in advance, which enables 
the anticipation and prevention of an accident. Table 8 shows 
that, at the selected maritime offshore company, the number 
of Safety Observations increased as the company’s fleet and 
experience increased. 
Table 8 Number of Safety Observations at the observed 
company over the years 2012.-2017.








According to internal procedures, a safety observation of an 
event that may cause an accident is reported by the First Mate, 
but all crew members are obliged to submit an anonymous 
report on safety errors. These reports are discussed in detail at 
the Weekly Safety Meeting and the minutes are sent to the so-
called Quality Manager on a monthly basis [14]. 
Records on all safety errors is not aimed at blaming an 
individual for being responsible for a technical and/or human 
error but aims at raising awareness of a potential incident 
and finding ways to avoid such occurrences in the future. 
It is important to emphasise that one of the reasons for the 
increased Safety Observations over the past two years resulted 
from an increased level of safety awareness across the senior 
officer population. 
The observed maritime offshore company has invested 
considerable funds in training their seafarers in prominent 
maritime training centres across the world. Every year the 
company organises a senior fleet officer meeting (SFOM) with 
a particular focus on safety and raising awareness of onboard 
safety [15]. Senior officers are required to disseminate the 
acquired knowledge and experience to junior officers and other 
crew members.
Table 9. presents the Safety Observations data, including 
TRI, TRIFR, LTI, and LTIFR on individual vessels operated by the 
selected offshore company. 
A detailed analysis of all the events that may have caused 
accidents in 2017 indicates that the vessel No. 4 recorded the 
highest rate of events in 2017. It also shows that there was 
no accident reported onboard that vessel over that year. The 
high number of observations can be justified by the increased 
awareness of safety among the senior officers and their detailed 
analyses carried out for each individual case. In this way, they 
paid particular attention to the importance of raising awareness 
of incidents across the offshore workforce. When observing the 
vessel No. 11 it can be concluded that detailed records were not 
kept because their data deviate from the average considerably: 
there were only 9 safety errors recorded over a period of one 
year. This implies a conclusion that the level of safety awareness 
of potential incidents on vessel No. 11 is low, whether due to 
the scope of operations or senior officers’ negligence, and that 
the safety awareness must be enhanced. When studying the 
data presented in the table, it becomes obvious that the Safety 
Observation system was not implemented properly on board 
vessel No. 11; there were no accidents reported in 2017, while 
only 9 potentially dangerous situations that may have resulted 
in an accident were reported.
The same table shows that for the vessels No. 3, 6, 8, 10 and 
12 the reports contained only one incident that caused lost time 
due to injury (TRI) and one event that did not result in loss of 
time (LTI).
The above discussion makes it clear that keeping records 
on potential onboard accidents reflects the level of safety 
awareness of the onboard management and other crew 
members. It should be underlined that the enhancement of 
safety awareness on board a vessel is achieved through regular 
Table 7 Lost time incident rate (LTIFR) and Total recordable incident rate (TRIFR) per unit  exposure hours
Tablica 7. Stopa izgubljenoga vremena zbog nezgode i ukupna zabilježena stopa nezgoda po jedinici sata izloženosti
LTIFR for 1,000,000 
manhours based on 12 
hours per man / day
TRIFR for 1,000,000 
manhours based on 12 
hours per man / day
HOURS
Day per man based on 
12h/day per person
Manhours based on 
12h/day per person
2009
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 6.2 20.75 12,051 144,612 
2010
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 0.00 4.02 41,437 497,245 
2011
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 1.87 7.48 44,560 534,714 
2012
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 5.99 7.48 55,691 668,292 
2013
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 5.91 17.74 70,445 845,340 
2014
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 0.00 7.79 74,887 898,644 
2015
Goal 0.00 <3    
Achieved 4.54 6.81 73,381 880,572 
2016
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 6.58 10.96 76,006 912,072 
2017
Goal 0.00 <2    
Achieved 4.93 6.16 67,667 812,004 
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drills and exercise across the fleet. According to the annual plan, 
exercise and training activities are performed once a week, 
typically prior to the weekly safety meeting. A well-trained 
crew will deal with the situations that may lead to accidents 
less often, due to increased awareness of hazards involved in 
everyday tasks. Likewise, it should be noted that, as a rule, a 
senior officer always makes a risk assessment prior to performing 
non-routine tasks, in accordance with the guidelines that the 
company laid out beforehand. If a risk assessment for a certain 
task does not exist, it must be carried out by the master or the 
head of deck/engine room. The performance of risk assessment 
is then followed by an obligatory Toolbox Talk (TBT) where the 
foreman or head of department discusses the assessed risk 
with his team, and the performance of the task is planned in 
detail to prevent any potentially hazardous situation [16]. If a 
potential hazard is anticipated during risk assessment, the task 
is suspended or delayed, and cannot be performed until risk 
assessment process starts anew [17]. All these measures are 
aimed at accident reduction. Similar practice is implemented at 
other offshore companies as well, as it has been proven that the 
companies that efficiently control potential risks (the risks they 
can affect) attract clients easier and have a higher standing on 
the competitive international market. 
4. CONCLUSION / Zaključak
The analysis of accidents at maritime offshore companies 
provides an insight into the inter-disciplinary quality of the 
issue. Maritime offshore companies make a segment of the 
overall maritime transport and are categorised among the 
companies operating special-purpose vessels that are engaged 
in a variety of tasks associated with the exploitation of crude 
oil and natural gas. The safety of performing these tasks 
has demanding requirements and, as a result, the offshore 
companies are regarded as high-risk operators whose activities 
and resources may, under certain conditions, present a threat to 
the environment, people and property.
The paper describes and discusses the essential safety 
factors in maritime transport. It has been pointed out that, in 
most cases, the risk of accident relates to human activities and 
capacities, i.e. to the employees who perform various tasks in 
specific segments of maritime transport. Another important 
factor is the very vessel that is engaged in specific operations, 
as its inherent features introduce certain deviations into the 
system of marine environment (ballast waters, safety materials 
having negative impacts, type of cargo, waste and so forth). 
There are numerous risk factors in maritime transport, but 
a proper organisation of activities and educated and well-
trained workforce are able to prevent undesired effects. Every 
company has its own way of raising awareness of safety at work, 
but all of them have to comply with a number of national and 
international rules, regulations and conventions in effect. The 
most frequent cause of safety errors lies in other prevailing 
interests such as economic profit, which tends to emphasise 
the involved risks to a lesser extent. When a problem occurs, 
the responsibility is typically interpreted in public in the most 
possible acceptable way, although the consequences of errors 
Table 9 Rate of recorded safety errors, including TRI, TRIFR, LTI, and LTIFR on board vessels operated by the selected offshore 
company in 2017 (explanations are below the Table)
Tablica 9. Stopa zabilježenih sigurnosnih grešaka uključujući TRI, TRIFR, LTI i LTIFR na brodovima kojima upravljaju odobalne kompanije 

































































































































1 49 12 105,840 53 1,002 0 0 0 0
2 50 14 119,160 50 839 0 0 0 0
3 36 13 114,336 37 647 1 17 1 17
4 262 14 121,968 272 4,460 0 0 0 0
5 93 13 114,240 94 1,646 0 0 0 0
6 97 13 114,288 102 1,785 1 17 1 17
7 42 12 106,392 43 808 0 0 0 0
8 44 14 121,968 44 722 1 16 1 16
9 79 15 131,400 79 1,202 0 0 0 0
10 48 18 155,424 50 643 1 13 0 0
11 9 18 158,184 10 126 0 0 0 0
12 94 14 123,072 98 1,593 1 16 1 16
13 65 16 137,736 65 944 0 0 0 0
*SOFR - Safety observation frequency rating (per 1,000,000 manhours) Stopa učestalosti sigurnosnih opažanja (po 1.000.000 radnih sati)
**TRI - Total number of recordables Ukupan broj zabilježbi
***TRIFR per 1,000,000 manhours - Total Recordable Incident Rate Frequence (based on 12 hours per men day) Ukupna zabilježena stopa učestalosti  nezgoda (temelj  je 12 sati po čovjeku dnevno)
****LTI - Lost Time Injuries Izgubljeno vrijeme zbog ozljeda
*****LTIFR - Lost Time Injury Frequency (per 1,000,000 manhours) Učestalost izgubljenog vremena zbog ozljede (po 1.000.000 radnih sati)
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have no ecological, social or economic justification. 
The promotion of safety measures implementation has 
given birth to organisations that specialise in specific issues. On 
the basis of experience and interpretation of regulations and 
legislation they raise awareness across the target populations. 
The agency IMCA was established to enhance the performance 
of maritime companies. On a voluntary basis, offshore 
companies are expected to file a report on accidents annually. 
IMCA uses these data to carry out a statistical analysis for all 
companies operating in a specific trade. Individual companies 
can then use the processed data to compare their performance 
indicators with other companies in the trade, and to focus on 
deviations and corrections. 
One offshore company has been selected for observation in 
this study. Although its identity has been protected, the data 
imply that the company has experienced an intensive growth 
over several years and now operates 13 vessels. It is worth 
noting that, during the period of expansion, the company 
management focused more on growth and less on accident 
monitoring. It is true that an incident does not necessarily 
have an impact if it is only recorded and removed. Although 
efforts were made to introduce higher quality standards, this 
did not significantly affect the overall business performance 
assessment with reference to the overall IMCA results. It should 
also be noticed that the deviations of performance indicators 
were sometimes very pronounced at the observed company.
Finally, it can be concluded that the transparency of 
operations and the performance based on the principles of 
responsible management have become an imperative. It is 
true that every error in performance may not and cannot be 
interpreted on equal basis, but it is clear that the accidents 
resulting in environment pollution, property damage, injuries 
or loss of life, produce negative publicity and affect a company’s 
standing in public and on the global competitive market.
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